La sostenibilità del debito pubblico delle pubbliche amministrazioni nella nuova Costituzione finanziaria.

The essay discusses the legal impact of the amendment of Article 81 of the Italian Constitution concerning the budget rules and pursues three goals. The first is to argue that the balanced or surplus budget rule as provided by the Fiscal compact cannot be incorporated sic et simpliciter into the Italian legal system, and that the amendment shall be interpreted as introducing the less rigorous “equilibrium” budget rule. The second is to demonstrate that only the “equilibrium” budget rule is in compliance with the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty concerning both the budgetary situation and the stock of government debt. The third goal is to argue that the concept of government debt sustainability, resulting now from Article 97 of the Constitution and interpreted in the light of the equilibrium rule, is more consistent than the balanced budget rule with the Constitutional system of rights and liberties.